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Managerial Valuation of Applicant Credentials and 
Personal Traits in Hiring Decisions 
 
We study how managers value applicant credentials and personal traits in hiring decisions. 
Using the ordered probit model, we confirm previous results – managers rank applicant traits 
higher than credentials. However, we also uncover patterns not previously observed – 
managerial valuations of some of these characteristics are dependent on managers’ 
perception of the overall state of the economy, on firm and immediate workplace 
characteristics, and on managers’ personal characteristics. Manager valuations of credentials 
vary with a large number of factors; this is not so for applicant personal traits. This is not 
surprising as most managers view the five traits considered “as extremely important.” 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
  Worker productivity may be enhanced by on-the-job training or by the adoption of 
various  human resource  management  practices,  such as  pay-for-performance  plans  and 
problem-solving  teams  (Ichniowski  and  Shaw,  2003).  However,  the  success  of  these 
various schemes partly depends on the quality of workers at the time of hiring. Therefore, it 
is of utmost importance that employers hire high quality workers at the outset.   
There  is  a  large  literature  on  businesses’  hiring  practices.  The  labor  economics 
literature primarily focuses on the determinants of who gets hired (See, e.g., Hu, 2003; and, 
Barron et al., 1985). Labor economists have also investigated whether hiring decisions are 
biased  against  minorities  (See,  e.g.,  Stoll  et  al.,  2004).  Traditionally,  labor  economists 
mainly use applicant credentials, such as education and labor market experience, when they 
study who gets hired; applicant personal traits are typically ignored.
1  
The labor economics literature to a lesser degree than the human resource literature, 
assumes  that  managers,  when  making  hiring  decisions,  choose  individuals  whose 
contribution to company goals would be largest; and, in an environment where individual 
contributions are hard to monitor, to hire individuals whose monitoring costs would be 
lowest. That is,  a  firm’s  profit  maximization motivates  managers’  decisions.  However, 
hiring decisions are not purely a function of optimizing behavior but also are a function of 
the characteristics of the agents making the decisions.
2 Thus, managerial valuations of both 
applicant credentials and personal traits may vary with their characteristics.    
                                                 
1 Recently, the importance of personal traits is recognized in labor economics. A number of studies have 
found evidence that personal traits, such as sociability, perseverance, and self-esteem, also affect earnings 
(See, e.g., Cawley et al., 2001; Dunifon et al., 2001; Heckman and Rubinstein, 2001; Goldsmith et al., 1997).  
Personal traits may also partly explain why some individuals are persistently not employed or why some have 
longer unemployment spells (See, e.g., Darity and Goldsmith, 1996).  
2  Kaufman (1999, p. 362) points out that in most extant labor economics literature, “imperfections or biases 
in information are introduced as a feature of the  environment, not the human agent.” That is, traditional  
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The human resource management literature recognizes the importance of applicant 
personal traits; and, there is a well-established framework for studying personal traits in 
this literature, namely the “Big Five” model of personality. The five dimensions in the “Big 
Five” model are Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness to Experience, Agreeableness, and 
Conscientiousness.
3 These traits are especially useful when hiring  managers have many 
qualified applicants  (based on credentials)  to choose from.  Interestingly, there is some 
evidence that managers put more weight on personal traits. For example, one study finds 
that employers rank applicant attitude much higher than years of completed schooling (4.6 
versus 2.9 on a five-point scale with 5 being very important and 1 being not important) 
when making hiring decisions (First Findings, 1995).
4  
Although  the  human  resou rce  management  literature  recognizes  the  effect 
individual characteristics may have in decision making processes, no one has investigated 
whether  managers’  valuation  of  applicant  credentials  and  personal  traits  vary  with 
managers’ personal characteristics, with managers’ perception of the overall state of the 
economy,  and  with  firm  and  immediate  workplace  characteristics.  To  study  these, 
questions specially designed for this study were appended to The Gallup Organization’s 
Workplace Audit. Managers were asked to rate on a five-point scale the importance of 
                                                                                                                                                    
models  abstract  from  the  characteristics  of  the  decision  makers  and  assume  that  individuals  are  rational 
decision makers.   
3 Neuroticism is the tendency to exhibit poor emotional adjustment, often characterized by chronic stress, 
anxiety, and depression (Judge and Ilies, 2002).  Extraversion refers   to  one’s  propensity  to  be  sociable, 
dominant, and positive in outlook (Watson and Clark, 1997).  Openness to Experience is the degree to which 
one is curious, creative, flexible, and unconventional in behavior (McCrae, 1996).  Agreeableness describes 
the propensity to be kind, gentle, trusting, trustworthy, and warm (Judge and Ilies, 2002).  Conscientiousness 
is a measure of reliability, responsibility, dependability, organization, and persistence (Judge et al., 2002). 
4 Other characteristics considered are applicant’s communication skills (4.2), previous work experience (4.0), 
recommendations from current employees (3.4), previous employer recommendation (3.4), industry-based 
credentials (3.2), score on tests administered as part of the interview (2.5), academic performance (2.5), 
experience or reputation of applicant’s school (2.4), and teacher recommendations (2.1).   
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applicant credentials (five factors) and personal traits (five factors) when making hiring 
decisions.  
Since  managerial  valuations  are  inherently  ordered,  we  use  the  ordered  probit 
model in our estimations. For the most part, we obtain fairly intuitive results. For example, 
managerial valuations of the importance of educational background (one of five applicant 
credential  variables  considered)  increase  with  managers’  educational  attainments; 
managers  who  are  confident  in  their  companies’  financial  future  tend  to  give  higher 
valuations to an applicant’s educational background, work record, work appraisals, and 
technical knowledge. Although manager valuations of credentials are found to vary with a 
large number of factors, this is not so for applicant personal traits. This is not surprising as 
most managers view the five traits considered “as extremely important.”   
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 contains a detailed discussion 
of the data and empirical method used. The results are presented and analyzed in Section 3. 
Finally,  Section  4  provides  the  implications  of  our  results  for  private  and  public 
policymaking. We also explore extensions to the current study in this section. 
 
2. DATA AND EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
2a. Data  
The  data  employed  come  from  The  Gallup  Organization.  Questions  relating  to 
managers’ hiring preferences were appended to Gallup’s Workplace Audit conducted in 
February 2003. Respondents to the survey who indicated that they have at least some hiring 
authority were asked how important selected applicant characteristics are when they make 
hiring  decisions.  Of  the  1,011  respondents,  289  respondents  have  at  least  some  hiring  
  4 
authority; a complete set of regressors are available for 249 respondents. Table 1 contains 
several respondent or manager characteristics.
5 For example, 20% report having complete 
authority in making hiring decisions, 57% are men, and 86% are white. 
Table 1 near here 
The  managers were asked to rate on a five -point scale the importance of the 
following  applicant  credentials  and  personal  traits :  a)  educational  background;  b) 
professional  references;  c)  work  record  or  experience;  d)  per formance  appraisals;  e) 
knowledge of technical skills; f) responsibility, dependability, thoroughness; g) persistence 
and the ability to stick with something to completion;  h) ability to take initiative and do 
things without being told;  i) ability to be open-minded to new experiences;  and, j) self-
confidence and belief in one’s abilities.
6 The first five capture individuals’ technical skills 
which economists deem to be directly  related to worker productivity;
7 the last five are 
personal traits which shape attitudes, and since attitudes lead to certain types of behavior, 
these broadly capture individuals’ behavioral skills. These five traits were chosen because 
                                                 
5 Our sample includes both executives and supervisors. All respondents who report having at least some 
hiring authority are included and, for brevity, we refer to them as managers.  
6 The questions read as follows: “Please tell me how important the following factors are to you in hiring 
employees. Using a five-point scale, where 5 is extremely important, and 1 is not important at all, please rate 
the  importance  of  the  following  factors  in  deciding  whether  to  HIRE  an  applicant.”  To  ensure  that  the 
responses are independent of the order by which the characteristics are presented, the order of presentation 
was randomized. For brevity, we shorten the names of some of these characteristics. For example, we refer to 
responsibility, dependability, thoroughness, as simply responsibility. 
7 These credentials are those most frequently ascertained in organizations’ selection systems. For instance, 
most  companies  use  some  sort  of  application  form  in  their  hiring  process.  These  forms  usually  contain 
sections  asking  about  educational  background,  work  record,  and  personal  and  professional  references. 
Technical skills, whether assessed through structured tests or prior performance appraisals, are also seen as 
valuable  predictors  of  future  work  performance  (See,  e.g.,  Wilk  and  Cappelli,  2003).  Compensation 
strategists have characterized work appraisal as the way that “organizations place value on the various parts 
of their structure through which employees carry out their business strategies and purpose. … job evaluation 
provides the essential link between business direction and individual [rate] value” (Murlis and Fitt, 1991, p. 
43).   
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of  their  demonstrated  relationship  with  job  performance.
8 Summary  statistics  of  the  
responses are tabulated in Table 2.
9 
Table 2 near here 
Of the ten characteristics we consider,  all personal traits have the highest mean 
scores  which  range from 4.35 to  4.73 (on a five -point scale with 5 being extremely 
important and 1 being not important at all), followed by work record with a mean score of 
4.17. Educational background has the lowest mean score at 3.64. It is not surprising that 
personal traits have the highest mean scores   given  managers’  objective  of  minimizing 
monitoring, termination, or quit costs. It is also not surprising that the mean for educational 
background is lower than that for work record. The latter is a better indicator of applicant 
productivity  in  the  workplace.  Because  potential  employees  also  need  to  acquire  firm-
specific skills to be productive, managers also deem “ability to be open-minded to new 
experience” as extremely important.
10 
Since the responses are  inherently ordered, the ordered probit model is used to 
determine whether the responses vary by environmental  or managerial characteristics. To 
maintain consistency with the literature, managerial responses are rec oded  as follows: 
                                                 
8 For example, meta-analyses of studies using the “Big Five” (Personality) taxonomy have demonstrated a 
clear and consistent relationship between conscientiousness and persistence and job performance across a 
wide range of occupations (Barrick and Mount, 1991) and openness to new experience has been found to be a 
“valid [predictor] of training proficiency across occupations” (Mount and Barrick, 1995, p. 168).  A proactive 
personality (i.e., initiative) has also been demonstrated to be both an antecedent to proactive behavior (Crant, 
2000) and a positive correlate of job performance (Crant, 1995). Support has also been found for a positive 
relationship  between  self-confidence  and  performance.  For  example,  Krishnan  et  al.  (2002)  find  this  in 
specific (e.g., sales) contexts while Stajkovic and Luthans (1998) find this in broadly diverse occupational 
contexts. 
9 Interestingly, when we conduct a factor analysis of the responses for the ten characteristics, two common 
factors are identified. All five credential items define factor one; and, factor two is found to represent all five 
personal traits. 
10 Our results are broadly consistent with those in First Findings (1995), see footnote 4.   
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Extremely important is recoded to 4 (from 5) and not important at all is recoded to 0 (from 
1).
11 We discuss the ordered probit model in the next sub-section. 
 
2b. Ordered Probit 
The model is defined as follows:
12 
10 ,..., 1 j , X R ij ij j
*
ij                    (1) 
where 
*
ij R  is the importance manager i gives to factor j when making a hiring decision; the 
matrix X contains environmental and managerial characteristics (to be described in detail 
below);
13 j are regression parameters and ij is a stochastic error term. 
Although 
*
ij R  is not observed, we do observe the responses of the managers to each 
















R if , 4
R if , 3
R if , 2
R if , 1
R if , 0 R
  
    
    
    
  
,         
                                                 
11 We keep the original value of the responses in Table 2. Ordered probit estimates of equation (1) and their 
marginal effects are based on these “transformed” values. We should note that no manager gave a response of 
“not  important  at  all”  for  three  personal  traits  (persistence,  initiative,  and  self-confidence).  For  these 
variables, the responses are coded as follows: extremely important is recoded to 3 (from 5), and so on.  
12 The following discussion is adopted from Greene (1997) and Gale et al. (2002). 
13 The notion that manager valuations of the ten characteristics are expect ed to systematically vary not only 
by the condition of the environment (captured by economy -wide  factors and by  firm and immediate 
workplace characteristics) but also by the characteristics of the manager is motivated by recent studies that 
have shown that decisions are not purely a function of optimizing behavior but also are a function of the 
characteristics of the agents making the decision. For example, List (2004) finds very strong evidence that 
individual (trading) actions (in a non-laboratory setting) are influenced by the amount of experience they have 
in the marketplace. In particular, individual behavior closely matches the prediction of the neoclassical model 
as they gain more experience. Mason et al. (1991) find that women tend to be more coopera tive than men 
(although the difference is not statistically significant) at the start of a series of non -cooperative games. 
However, men become more cooperative over time.   
  7 
where  each  of  the  j’s  denote  unknown  threshold  parameters  for  each  factor  j.    The 
managers in principle could respond with their own valuation (
* R ). However, since the 
responses are limited to just five choices, managers will choose the response “that most 
closely represents their own feelings...” (Greene, 1997, p. 927). Given the assumptions of 
the ordered probit model, the following probabilities for each response k can be derived: 
      ij j j , k ij j j , 1 k X X k R Pr             ,          (2) 
where (.) is the cumulative density function for a normal random variable. 
Table 3 contains summary statistics pertaining to environmental factors: managers’ 
perception  of  the  overall  state  of  the  economy,  industry  and  firm  characteristics,  and 
immediate workplace characteristics. Of the 249 managers in our sample, 23% report that 
they feel that the economy is in excellent or good condition, 14% are in the manufacturing 
sector, 67% work for companies with fewer than 500 employees, and 66% report that their 
team’s (or department’s) productivity improved during the past year. 
Table 3 near here 
Responses are expected to vary with managers’ perceptions of the overall state of 
the economy at the time of the interview (CURRENT CONDITION); and with managers’ 
expectations  about  the  state  of  the  economy  a  year  from  the  time  of  the  interview 
(FUTURE CONDITION). Both are qualitative variables. CURRENT CONDITION equals 
1  when  the  economy  is  perceived  to  be  in  good  or  excellent  condition;  FUTURE 
CONDITION equals 1 when the economy is expected to get better in a year. Gorter et al. 
(2003) and Barron et al. (1985) provide clear evidence that labor market conditions (which 
are dependent on macroeconomic conditions) affect the structure of hiring. This suggests 
that managers’ valuation of the ten characteristics may vary depending on their perceptions  
  8 
of the current and future state of the overall economy. As Darity and Goldsmith (1996, p. 
134) point out, if “firms are risk averse and that information is asymmetric, then firms are 
likely to be cautious and reluctant in hiring from the pool of the unemployed, since they are 
not sure how much a given individual has been damaged psychologically by their exposure 
to  joblessness.”  That  is,  to  minimize  the  chance  of  hiring  an  individual  in  poor 
psychological health (a consequence of unemployment) managers are expected to put more 
importance on personal traits during periods of high unemployment than they normally 
would. In our context, this means that some of the five personal traits may be judged less 
important when the economy is perceived to be in good or excellent condition (a tight labor 
market) or when the economy is expected to get better in the future. That is, negative 
coefficients are expected for CURRENT CONDITION and FUTURE CONDITION in all 
personal traits regressions.
14 
Manager responses are also expected to systematically vary with industry and firm 
characteristics. These include an indicator of the sector a manager works in, company size 
(measured  using  the  number of employees),  company  hiring  practice,  and manager’s 
perceptions of the company’s financial condition at the time of the interview and manager’s 
expectations about the company’s financial future.  
We have no expectation as to how managers in the manufacturing sector would rate 
these  ten  factors  compared  to  managers  not  in  the  manufacturing  sector.  Manager 
                                                 
14 It should be pointed out that in the ordered probit model, a statistically significant negative coefficient 
estimate indicates that an increase in the relevant independent variable decreases the probability that the 
manager will respond “extremely important” (4, highest value for the dependent variable) and increases the 
probability that the manager will respond “not important at all” (0, lowest value). However, it is not clear how 
probabilities for responses between the highest and lowest values change with the independent variable. In the 
context  of  qualitative  independent  variables,  a  statistically  significant  negative  coefficient  indicates  that 
compared to the base, the probability that the manager will respond “extremely important” (“not important at 
all”) is lower (higher). Similarly, it is not clear how probabilities for responses 1 to 3 change with the dummy 
variable. See Greene (1997) for details.    
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valuations of credentials are expected to increase with company size. According to Dupray 
(2001), larger firms tend to employ more complex production technologies and experience 
faster rates of technical and organizational change. These suggest that “the cost of a bad 
job-worker match could be much more costly than in a small company” (Dupray, 2001, p. 
14). Indeed, the author finds that more educated individuals are more likely to be hired by 
large companies. In addition, if monitoring costs increase with firm size (See, e.g., Garen, 
1985), manager valuations of personal traits are also expected to increase with company 
size. Companies are classified into three groups: companies with less than 500 employees; 
companies with 500 to less than 10,000 employees; and, companies with 10,000 employees 
or more. Since the base group is companies with at least 10,000 employees, COMPANY 
SIZE is expected to have negative coefficients in all regressions.  
Managers  employed  in  companies  that  base  their  hiring  decisions  on  structured 
interviews  and  tests  (as  opposed  to  informal  interviews)  are  expected  to  give  higher 
valuations  to  each  of  the  credential  variables.  Cognitive  dissonance  theory  (Festinger, 
1957) suggests  that managers  working in  organizations  that utilize structured tests  and 
formal interviews would place more value on objective credentials. This allows managers 
to align their behaviors (i.e., use objective information) in a manner that would maintain 
consistency with an implicit attitude that formal selection methods lead to a more rational 
decision.  Since  we  define  HIRING  PRACTICE=1  when  managers  report  that  hiring 
decisions are based on structured interviews and tests, HIRING PRACTICE is expected to 
have positive coefficients in the credentials regressions. Symmetrically, we expect HIRING 
PRACTICE to have negative coefficients in the personal traits regressions.  
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Managers’  perceptions  of  the  current  and  future  financial  conditions  of  the 
companies they work for are also expected to affect their valuations. The rationale provided 
for managers’ perceptions about the current and future state of the overall economy applies 
here  as  well.  That  is,  (perceived)  context  matters.  We  define  COMPANY  CURRENT 
CONDITION=1  when  the  company’s  current  financial  condition  is  perceived  to  be 
excellent or good; two dummy variables capture managers’ confidence in the financial 
future of the companies they work for (COMPANY FUTURE CONDITION). The base 
category for COMPANY FUTURE CONDITION is when managers disagree or strongly 
disagree with the following statement “I am confident in my company’s financial future.” 
Thus,  these  three  dummy  variables  are  expected  to  have  negative  coefficients  in  the 
personal traits regressions.  
There is, however, an alternative explanation as to why valuations are expected to 
vary with perceived current company condition. This explanation is partly motivated by an 
anomaly  that  has  been  consistently  observed  in  non-market  or  market  experiments: 
individual preferences appear to be not independent of endowment (See, e.g., List, 2004). 
An  individual’s  valuation  of  a  good  rises  with  ownership  of  the  said  good.
15 This 
psychological effect in our context may be interpreted as follows: People prefer to work for 
companies in excellent financial condition. Hence, if managers perceive that the companies 
they  work  for  are  in  excellent  condition,  their  valuation  of  their  jobs  would  rise. 
Maintenance of their companies’ finances becomes more important; thus, managers would 
give higher valuations to each of the ten factors. This is because one way to preserve (if not 
improve) a company’s financial condition is the selection and hiring of “good” workers. 
This  means  that  COMPANY  CURRENT  CONDITION  is  expected  to  have  positive 
                                                 
15 This anomaly is referred to as the endowment effect.  
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coefficients in all regressions. However, since this and the previous  explanation lead to 
opposite predictions, the sign for COMPANY CURRENT CONDITION  in the personal 
traits regressions is then ambiguous. 
Immediate workplace  characteristics include productivity, turn-over, gender mix, 
and racial mix. We define productivity as the quantity and quality of work done, taking into 
account the amount of resources used. Our expectation on how the managers’ responses are 
correlated with productivity depends on the following assumption: Managers make rational 
decisions, i.e., decisions are consistent and maximize value (Simon, 1986). Based on this 
assumption,  if  an  organization  has  established  a  level  of  success  with  regard  to  its 
productivity, we would expect that it would make decisions that would have the lowest 
probability of causing that performance to decline. Thus, managers are expected to value 
each of the characteristics more. We define PRODUCTIVITY=1 when the workplace is 
reported to have experienced an improvement; thus, we anticipate that PRODUCTIVITY 
will have positive coefficients in either the credentials or personal traits regressions. This 
explanation is quite similar to the endowment effect identified in the previous section.  
Attribution  theory  has  two  tenets:  self-serving  bias  and  fundamental  attribution 
error.  Self-serving bias characterizes the tendency to attribute our own success to internal 
factors and our failures to external ones, one effect being to help preserve psychological 
well-being (Miller and Ross, 1975). The basic principle of the fundamental attribution error 
is that when making judgments about the behavior of other people, we tend to overestimate 
the importance of internal factors and underestimate the importance of external factors 
(Miller and  Lawson, 1989). Taken together, these provide a theoretical explanation for 
managers’ valuation of applicant characteristics based on company turnover.   
  12 
There are two main  reasons why employees leave organizations. First, when an 
employee leaves an organization, the employee, at some level, is rejecting the company. 
Thus,  this  could  be  viewed  as  a  failure  of  the  organization  in  its  ability  to  retain  its 
workforce.  The second  explanation follows from attribution theory. Based on  the self-
serving  bias  principle,  managers  would  attribute  an  employee’s  departure  to  some 
deficiency  on  the  employee’s  part,  as  opposed  to  an  organizational  shortcoming.  The 
fundamental attribution error principle, in  addition, would predict that  managers would 
attribute such deficiencies to an internal characteristic of the employee (e.g., lack of desire, 
unwillingness  to  work  hard),  and  thus  would  be  more  cautious  in  relying  on  personal 
characteristics  (i.e.,  traits),  and,  accordingly,  would  more  likely  to  weigh  objective 
information  (i.e.,  credentials)  more  heavily  when  selecting  new  employees.  We  define 
TURNOVER=1  if  the  immediate  workplace  is  reported  to  have  experienced  increased 
turnover;  following  attribution  theory,  TURNOVER  is  expected  to  have  positive 
coefficients in the credentials regressions and negative coefficients in the personal traits 
regressions.  
We  classify  workplaces  according  to  their  gender  composition  as  follows:  co-
workers  mostly  men  (GENDER  MIX:  MOSTLY  MEN);  co-workers  mostly  women 
(GENDER MIX: MOSTLY WOMEN); and, co-workers half-men, half-women. We define 
the last category as the base group. Our expectations for these variables depend on two 
assumptions: first, managers consider the effects of their decisions on the dynamics of the 
workplace;
16  second,  men  put  more  weight  on  objective  characteristics .
17  If  both 
                                                 
16 There is a fair amount of evidence that leads to the conclusion that, in general, managers are risk averse 
(See,  e.g.,  Janis  and  Mann,  1977).   The  literature  in  group  dynamics  details  the  power  of  pressures  on 
individuals to conform with group norms in order to gain acceptance (Kiesler and Kiesler, 1969).  Going  
  13 
assumptions  hold,  given  our  variable  definitions,  we  would  expect  GENDER  MIX: 
MOSTLY MEN to have positive coefficients in the credentials regressions and GENDER 
MIX: MOSTLY WOMEN to have positive coefficients in the personal traits regressions.  
Managerial valuations of the ten characteristics are also assumed to be related to the 
racial  composition  of  the  immediate  workplace.  We  define  RACIAL  MIX:  MOSTLY 
SAME=1 if co-workers mostly are of the same race. Managers making hiring decisions 
often develop an unconscious schema, or mental model, about the attributes of applicants 
(Fiske and Taylor, 1991). Even if not based on conscious discrimination, such schemas are 
often based on demographic characteristics, such as race (Powell and Butterfield, 2002). 
Race  becomes  part  of  the  hiring  decision-making  schema  when  the  incumbents  are 
primarily of one race.  Thus, when, for instance, white individuals dominate the incumbents 
in  a  particular  job  title,  decision  makers  are  more  likely  to  view  white  applicants  as 
possessing  the  personal  qualities  necessary  for  success  in  the  position.   The  sign  for 
RACIAL MIX: MOSTLY SAME in all regressions is ambiguous as it depends on both the 
race of the applicant and the racial composition of the current incumbents.  
Seven managerial characteristics available from the survey are considered: hiring 
authority,  tenure  with  the  company,  tenure  at  the  position,  gender,  race,  age,  and 
educational  attainment.  Managers  are  classified  into  three  hiring  authority  groups. 
Managers  with  less  control  over  hiring  are  expected  to  systematically  give  higher 
valuations to each of the credential variables considered: The less complete one’s hiring 
                                                                                                                                                    
against group norms would thus run the risk of one’s not being accepted, and hence we would expect most 
managers to conform with his/her group’s norms.   
17 For example, some studies of strategic decision-making have found that women place greater emphasis on 
non-financial goals relative to men (Kaplan, 1988); rate intrinsi c motivators (e.g., recognition) as more 
important than do men (Fischer et al., 199 3); and, are more likely to rely less on systematic processes than 
men (Brush, 1992).  
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authority, the more probable that a hiring decision may need to be defended (to a superior); 
and, the more the need to conform with the norm of making decisions based on objective 
criteria.
18 Since managers are classified into three groups, with the group having complete 
control as the base, the above explanation suggests positive (negative)  coefficients for 
HIRING  AUTHORITY  in  the  credentials  (personal  traits)   regressions.  However, 
conditional  on  an  applicant  having  the  requisite  credentials,  managers  with  less  hiring 
authority may also put more importance on personal traits as doing so tends to minimize 
the chance of making a bad hire. That is, positive coefficients for HIRING AUTHORITY 
cannot  be  ruled  out  in  the  personal  traits  regressions.  Thus,  the  sign  for  HIRING 
AUTHORITY in the personal traits regressions is ambiguous. 
Recently,  studies  have  found  that  experience  in  the  marketplace  and  gender 
influence  individual  choices  and  behavior  (e.g.,  risk-taking)  in  market  and  non-market 
settings. For example, Myagkov and Plott (1997) find that participants in an experiment 
become less risk-seeking with experience; Dwyer et al. (2002) find that women take less 
risk than men in financial matters. These suggest that managerial valuations of each of the 
ten characteristics will also vary by tenure, age, and gender.
19  
Valuations  of  applicant  credentials  are  expected  to  be  higher,  the shorter  the 
manager’s  experience  level.  That  is,  managers  with  less  experience  with  the  company 
(TENURE WITH COMPANY) or at the current position (TENURE AT POSITION) are 
expected to put more value on objective characteristics (i.e., on credentials). The rationale 
as to why these factors are expected to be correlated with managers’ responses is the same 
                                                 
18 There is evidence that group members of higher status are allowed to deviate from the norms to a greater 
degree than lower status members (Hackman, 1992). 
19 That is, since individual choices and actions are dependent on their tastes or preferences, managerial 
valuations of the ten factors are also expected to vary based on these same characteristics.  
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to those given for hiring authority.  Three tenure groups are considered;  the base group 
being  those  that  have  at  least  15  years  of  tenure   (those  with  most  seniority).  This 
classification scheme suggests that we expect TENURE WITH COMPANY and TENURE 
AT POSITION to have positive coefficients in the credentials regressions. This is because 
reliance on more objective criteria may require less defense of a bad choice brought about 
by inexperience. And, the need to conform to the norm of rational decision-making is also 
more intense the shorter the tenure. Negative coefficients, on the other hand, are expected 
in each of the personal trait regressions. However, positive coefficients cannot be ruled out 
in the personal trait regressions. As previously indicated, to minimize the chance of making 
a bad hire, if managers with shorter tenures are more cautious, conditional on applicants 
having  the  requisite  credentials,  managers  with  shorter  tenures  may  also  put  more 
importance on personal traits. 
While tenure with company and tenure at position capture experience related to the 
job, the inclusion of the age variable controls for managers’ tolerance for risk taking. In a 
study examining asset allocation decisions, Riley and Chow (1992) found that risk aversion 
declined with age, up to age 65, at which point risk aversion increased. Since the relevant 
age group for our purposes is less than 65 (all but four of our managers are 65 years old or 
less), conditional on applicants having the requisite credentials, the valuation of personal 
traits is expected to increase with the manager’s age. AGE is expected to have positive 
coefficients in the personal traits regressions.  
Although there is growing evidence in the management literature that there are few, 
if  any,  substantial  differences  between  men  and  women  on  measures  of  performance-
related ability (e.g., Eagly and Carli, 1981; Hyde, 1981), there are several indications that  
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the two genders do differ in their management styles. For instance, women seem to use 
more interpersonal skills when leading subordinates, whereas men tend to rely on formal 
structure and authority in their leadership activities (Druskat, 1994; Eagly  and Johnson, 
1990).  One  would  expect,  then,  that  women  would  focus  mo re  on  personal  traits  in 
selection  decisions,  at  least  relative to  men.   Thus,  a  positive  (negative) coefficient  is 
expected for MALE in each of the credentials (personal traits) regressions. 
We  expect  non-white  managers  to  rate  the  importance  of  subjective  applicant 
characteristics (i.e., personal traits) higher than white managers; this is due to a greater 
tendency for non-white managers to feel themselves discriminated against and evaluated 
inequitably  on  workplace  measures  (See,  e.g.,  Dixon  et  al.,  2002).
20 Thus, WHITE is 
expected to have a negative coefficient in each of the personal traits regressions. Likewise, 
we also expect white managers to rate the importance of objective applicant characteristics 
higher than non-white managers; thus, a positive coefficient is expected for WHITE in each 
of the credentials regressions. 
Finally, managers’ valuation of applicant credentials is expected to increase with 
managers’ educational attainment. For example, investments made by managers in their 
own  education  signal  the  importance  they  place  on  this  factor.  Managers  are  grouped 
according to whether or not they are at least a college graduate. Since at least a college 
graduate is the base group, EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT is expected to have negative 
coefficients in some of the credentials regressions. 
 
                                                 
20 Dixon et al. (2002), in a study of more than 1,000 university employees, find that black and Hispanic 
workers perceive themselves to be discriminated against and treated unfairly compared to their white co-
workers. This would in turn, theoretically, make the non-white managers more sensitive to the need to judge 
others on more than just objective criteria.   
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3. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
The coefficient estimates for the ordered probit models are contained in Tables 4 
and 5. Judging by the computed 
2 values (with 24 degrees of freedom), with the exception 
of one, all models are statistically significant at conventional levels of significance. Three 
goodness-of-fit  measures  suggest  that  the  models  have  fairly  decent  fits.  We  consider 
variables  that  are  found  to  be  statistically  significant  in  at  least  the  10%  level  below. 
Managers’ valuation of the importance of work record, work appraisals, persistence, and 
open-mindedness in hiring decisions vary with their perceptions of the current state of the 
economy. Perception of the company’s future financial condition is found to be statistically 
significant for educational background, work record, work appraisals, technical knowledge, 
responsibility, persistence, and initiative. The characteristics of the immediate workplace 
are found to be statistically insignificant in all cases except two.  
Tables 4 and 5 near here 
With regard to managers’ characteristics, hiring authority is statistically significant 
for work record and technical knowledge. Tenure with company is statistically significant 
for  work  record  and  responsibility.  A  manager’s  tenure  at  the  current  position  is 
statistically significant for references, work record, work appraisals, and self-confidence. 
Age is statistically significant for responsibility, persistence, initiative and self-confidence. 
A manager’s race is also found to be related to the valuation of applicants’ work appraisals 
and  self-confidence.  Finally,  educational  attainment  is  statistically  significant  for 
educational  background,  work  appraisals,  persistence,  initiative,  open-mindedness,  and 
self-confidence.  
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To better understand the implications of our results, we present the marginal effects 
of the variables found to be statistically significant in at least the 10% level in Tables 6 and 
7. The marginal effects for each of the characteristics (except Age) are obtained as follows: 
Pr[R|x=1]  -  Pr[R|x=0], with all other characteristics kept at the  mean  values. We also 
indicate the statistical significance of the marginal effects. 
Tables 6 and 7 near here 
Consider the marginal effects for educational background in Table 6. The results 
indicate that managers who report that they strongly agree, agree (marginal effect=0.1662) 
or  are  neutral  (marginal  effect=0.2249)  with  the  statement  “I  am  confident  in  my 
company’s financial future” are more likely (than managers who report that they disagree 
or strongly disagree with the statement) to rate this characteristic as extremely important 
(R=4);
21 and,  the differences  are  statistically  significant at the 1% level .  This is not 
unanticipated given the proclivity of managers in Western democracies (e.g., the United 
States) to state a prefere nce for rationality in making decisions  (Robbins, 2001).   Thus, 
managers responding to a question about a future positive outcome might be expected to 
give great weight to an objective (i.e., rational) attribute of those who would contribute to 
that success, namely prospective employees.  
This bias toward proclaiming a rational foundation in decision maki ng may also 
account for the fact that in our study, a ll else  being  equal, managers whose team or 
department experienced increased turnover in the past year  were also more likely to value 
educational background as extremely  important (marginal effect=0.1018), consistent with 
                                                 
21 This also means that they are less likely to respond not important at all (R=0). Note that the sum of the 
probabilities  for  each  row  in  Tables  6  and  7  equals  one.  Our  analysis  focuses  on  the  upper  tail  of  the 
probability distributions. We should further note that the marginal effects at all response values for the most 
part are statistically significant in at least the 10% level.  
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our a priori expectations. The difference in the probabilities is statistically significant at the 
1% level. 
Managers with no college degrees are less likely to rate educational background as 
extremely important when hiring employees (marginal effect=-0.0756). The difference in 
the probabilities is statistically significant at the 10% level.  This outcome is not surprising; 
managers tend to show positive bias toward those they perceive to be similar to them.  This 
similarity effect is frequently seen in the human resource practices of both  selection and 
performance appraisal (Mathis and Jackson, 2003; Pulakos and Wexley, 1983).   
Managerial valuations of professional references are correlated only with managers’ 
tenure at their current position. Managers who have been in their current position for less 
than three years are less likely to rate references as extremely important than managers that 
have been in their current position for 15 years or more (base group). The difference in the 
probability is about 30%. A qualitatively similar result is obtained for managers who have 
been  in  their  current  position  for  3  to  less  than  15  years.  Both  marginal  effects  are 
statistically significant at the 1% level. These results are opposite those of our expectations. 
In the previous section, we argued that managers with shorter tenures are expected to put 
more value on objective characteristics. This is because a bad choice brought about by 
inexperience may require less defense to a superior if the choice was based on objective 
(rather  than  subjective)  criteria.  A  plausible  explanation  for  our  results  is  this:  while 
obtaining  employment  background  information  (i.e.,  reference  checks)  on  prospective 
employees  has  been  a  long-standing,  widespread,  organizational  practice  (Muchinsky, 
1979; Ryan and Lasek, 1991), the current consensus among human resource management 
researchers  and  practitioners  is  that  reference  checks  have  little  utility  in  the  selection  
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process (See, e.g., Hunter and Hunter, 1984; Reilly and Chao, 1982). The primary reason 
for this is that applicants are unlikely to supply a reference source who is likely to provide 
negative information; and employers, due to fears of defamation litigation, are increasingly 
unlikely to offer more than verification of employment dates.  Therefore, managers  with 
shorter tenures would be less apt to place as much weight on information obtained from 
reference checks than would their counterparts with longer tenures, for whom the practice 
of obtaining background information would more probably have become a matter of habit.   
Managers’  valuations  of  work  record  and  performance  appraisals  vary  with  the 
most number of factors. Managers who rate the economic condition of the country today as 
good  or  excellent  are  less  likely  to  view  an  applicant’s  work  record  and  appraisals  as 
extremely important. The marginal effects are -0.1636 and -0.1383, respectively; and, both 
effects are statistically significant at the 1% level. Managers who report that they strongly 
agree or agree with the statement “I am confident in my company’s financial future” are 
more likely to rate these characteristics as extremely important. The probability differences 
are also statistically significant at the 1% level. These results seem contradictory, but they 
are  not.  The  first  result  suggests  that  managers  place  less  value  on  work  record  and 
performance  appraisals  when  the  labor  market  is  (perceived  to  be)  tight.  One  way  to 
preserve (if not improve) their companies’ financial future is to hire “good” workers. Thus, 
managers place higher valuations on work record and performance appraisals when they 
are confident in their companies’ financial future. 
As suggested in the preceding section, managers with less hiring authority would 
probably exhibit a lower tendency to risk norm violation by using objective information to 
a greater extent than managers with more authority. Our results support this contention, as  
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the less hiring authority managers have, the more likely they are to judge work record as 
extremely important. The difference in the probabilities between managers with complete 
and managers with (only) a great deal of hiring authority is about 14%. 
All else equal, tenure with the company also affects a manager’s valuation of work 
record. In particular, managers are more likely to rate work record as extremely important 
the shorter their tenure is with the company. This is consistent with our expectations. The 
difference in probabilities is not only statistically significant but also practically significant 
at  about  30-38%.  Interestingly,  tenure  at  the  current  position  has  the  opposite 
effectmanagers are less likely to rate work record as extremely important the shorter 
their  tenure  is  at  the  current  position.  A  similar  qualitative  result  is  found  for  work 
appraisals. A conjectural explanation for these dissimilar results is this: When a manager is 
a relative newcomer to an organization, he/she may be more likely to rely on objective 
evaluation measures, so as to conform with group norms. On the other hand, managers who 
are newcomers to a position may very well be more apt to take a “clean slate” approach, 
i.e., reserve judgment on employees’ work record until they have had the opportunity to 
view their workers’ performance firsthand.  
Controlling  for  all  other  factors,  white  managers  are  less  likely  to  rate  work 
appraisals as extremely important (marginal effect=-0.2273). We had expected a positive 
coefficient with a belief that non-whites  will place less importance on  work appraisals 
when they believe that these are done unfairly. However, we obtain a result that is opposite 
of our expectation. The desire to conform could explain why non-white managers would 
more likely give a higher valuation (than whites) to an objective characteristic.   
  22 
Managers without at least a college degree are more likely to rate work appraisals 
as extremely important (marginal effect=0.1014). Lesser-educated managers value work 
appraisals more as they may not have the technical knowledge to evaluate applicants using 
factors that are not directly related to the work under consideration. The marginal effect for 
this relationship is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Managers who are neutral with the statement “I am confident in my company’s 
financial  future”  are  more  likely  to  rate  technical  knowledge  as  extremely  important 
(marginal effect=0.2117). And, the less hiring authority managers have, the more likely 
knowledge of technical skills will be judged to be extremely important. These results are 
consistent with our expectations. 
Turning  to  the  five  traits,  we  find  that  the  marginal  effects  are  statistically 
significant for only a small number of variables; and, for practical purposes significant for 
even fewer variables, see Table 7. This is not surprising as almost all respondents rate these 
characteristics as extremely important or important (See Table 2); three of these traits did 
not even receive a response of “not important at all” from a respondent. These traits are 
persistence, initiative, and self-confidence.  
Valuations  of  responsibility  and  open-mindedness  tend  to  vary  with  selected 
environmental and managerial characteristics. Managers who rate their company’s current 
financial condition as excellent or good are less likely to rate responsibility as extremely 
important to hiring whereas managers who strongly agree or agree with the statement “I am 
confident  in  my  company’s  financial  future”  are  more  likely  to  rate  responsibility  as 
extremely important. The marginal effects are -0.2150 and 0.4305, respectively; and, both 
are statistically significant at the 1% level. The former result suggests that personal traits  
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are judged by managers to be less important when they perceive their companies to be 
doing well.  The latter result is consistent with the notion that a desire to not change a 
successful  system  will  lead  managers  to  put  more  importance  on  all  applicant 
characteristics. 
Compared  to  managers  in  a  gender-mixed  work  environment,  managers  in 
workplaces  that  are  mostly  women  are  more  likely  to  rate  responsibility  as  extremely 
important  (marginal  effect=0.1594).  This  comports  with  a  stream  of  organizational 
literature suggesting that, compared to men, women are much more likely to not only  be 
expected to demonstrate conscientiousness, but actually do so (See, e.g., Lippa, 1995). So, 
managers in workplaces that consist mostly of women would value this characteristic more 
highly  than  managers  in  gender-mixed  workplaces.  The  marginal  effect,  though,  is 
statistically significant only at the 10% level.  
All else equal, managers who have been with the company for less than three years 
are less likely to rate responsibility as extremely important (marginal effect=-0.1145). A 
similar result is obtained for older managers. Although both are statistically significant at 
the 5% level, the probability differences are small. The first result could be explained by 
the conformity pressures outlined earlier. In addition, managers with shorter tenures may 
have  less  opportunity  to  see  the  benefits  of  responsibility  in  an  employee  over  time, 
particularly in comparison with their longer-serving colleagues; thus, they place less value 
on responsibility. Although  we had  expected AGE to have positive  coefficients in the 
personal traits regressions, it not surprising that we find a negative coefficient for AGE 
here. This is because older managers might also want to comply with norms of objectivity 
since  older  managers often perceive themselves  to  be  more  vulnerable to  having  their  
  24 
employment terminated than  younger workers.  Thus, they would place less value on a 
subjective characteristic than their younger counterparts.
22 
With regard to open-mindedness, extremely important is a less likely response for 
managers who perceive that the current economic conditions are excellent or good, perhaps 
due to concerns about changing things during times of positive outcomes; or, for managers 
in manufacturing, where changes in systematic processes might be counterproductive.  The 
marginal effects are -0.1500 and -0.1799, respectively. Finally, managers without at least a 
college degree are more likely to rate open-mindedness as extremely important (marginal 
effect=0.2140). All the marginal effects are statistically significant at the 1% level.  
The  following  generalizations  can  be  made  from  the  above  results:  manager 
valuations of credentials mostly vary with manager’s perceptions of the current state of the 
overall economy; with the future state of their companies; with manager’s hiring authority, 
tenure at the current position, and educational attainment. Since very little variation exists 
in how managers rate the five traits, it is not surprising that very few of the coefficient 
estimates (and marginal effects) are statistically and practically significant in the personal 
traits regressions. 
 
4. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
The increasing level of demographic diversity in U.S. workplaces, combined with 
the knowledge that individuals often are attracted to, selected by, and exit companies based 
                                                 
22 This fear has enough of a basis in reality that U.S. workers over 40 years of age receive protection from 
discrimination in employment under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).  Passed in 1967, 
and amended in 1978 and 1986, the ADEA covers all employment practices, including hiring, discharge, pay, 
promotions,  benefits,  and  other  terms  of  employment.  According  to  one  professional  human  resources 
association, the area of layoffs/downsizing has the greatest potential  for age discrimination, due to such 
factors as older employees earning higher wages on average than younger workers, stereotypes about older 
individuals not having the requisite stamina to perform certain jobs, even concerns about the “image” that 
older workers portray to customers and clients of an organization (Quirk, 1993).    
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upon  the  congruence  of  their  own  personal  characteristics  (e.g.,  attitudes,  values)  and 
attributes of the employing organization (e.g., structure and culture) (See, e.g., Schneider, 
1987; Schneider et al., 1995) makes the investigation of managerial valuations of applicant 
characteristics particularly relevant. Prospective employees need to know how managers 
value  credentials  and  personal  traits.  We  confirm  previous  results—managers  rank 
applicant traits higher than credentials when making hiring decisions. We also uncover 
patterns not previously observed—managerial valuations of some of these characteristics 
are dependent on managers’ perception of the overall state of the economy, on firm and 
immediate workplace characteristics, and on managers’ personal characteristics. 
The  paper  can  be  extended  in  two  directions.  First,  a  similar  analysis  can  be 
conducted for  promotions.  Do credentials  become as  important  as  personal  traits  when 
managers make promotion decisions? Second, individuals in the job market can be asked 
how  important  they  think  managers  value  each  of  the  credentials  and  personal  traits 
considered. This will provide a much needed insight as to whether there is congruence 
between  employers’  valuations  and  what  prospective  employees  think  employers  value 
(when  making  hiring  and  promotion  decisions).  If  these  two  groups’  valuations  are 
incongruent, then there is an incentive for government to encourage businesses to develop 
more  transparent  screening  and  reward  structures.  One  practical  benefit  of  this  is  the 
potential  for  a  more  congruent  match  between  employer  and  employees,  leading  to 
decreases  in  turnover,  absenteeism,  counterproductive  behavior,  etc.  From  a  societal 
perspective, greater efficiencies in government budgetary policy directed at workforce re-
training  and  subsidization  of  certain  chronically  underemployed  populations  (e.g.,  
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racial/ethnic  minorities,  women,  etc.)  could  be  achieved  through  better  “fit”  between 
employers and workers.  
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TABLE 1. SUMMARY OF MANAGERIAL CHARACTERISTICS  
   
Characteristics  Mean 
     
Hiring authority   
     Some   0.37 
     Great deal  0.43 
     Complete (base)  0.20 
Tenure with company   
      Less than 3 years  0.27 
      Three years to less than 15 years   0.45 
      Fifteen years or more (base)  0.28 
Tenure at position   
      Less than 3 years  0.39 
      Three years to less than 15 years   0.49 
      Fifteen years or more (base)  0.11 
Age  42.25 
Male  0.57 
White  0.86 
Educational attainment   
      Less than college graduate (base)   0.41 
      At least college graduate   0.59  
Note: Tabulated from Gallup’s Workplace Audit conducted February 2003. 
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TABLE 2. SUMMARY OF MANAGER RESPONSES 
HOW IMPORTANT ARE APPLICANT CREDENTIALS AND PERSONAL TRAITS  
                   
    Standard  Coefficient of      Distribution of responses   
  Mean  Deviation  Variation        (in %)     
               5  4  3  2  1 
APPLICANT CREDENTIALS:                   
Educational Background  3.64  0.96  26.28    19.68  36.14  36.14  4.82  3.21 
References  3.72  1.00  26.94    25.70  32.53  32.93  6.02  2.81 
Work Record  4.17  0.82  19.70    40.16  40.16  16.87  2.41  0.40 
Work Appraisals   3.92  0.92  23.38    30.12  38.55  25.70  4.42  1.20 
Technical Knowledge  3.98  0.91  22.84    31.73  41.37  21.69  3.61  1.61 
 
PERSONAL TRAITS:                   
Responsibility  4.73  0.56  11.93    77.51  19.28  2.41  0.40  0.40 
Persistence  4.55  0.65  14.20    62.65  30.52  6.02  0.80  0.00 
Initiative  4.67  0.60  12.86    72.29  23.29  3.21  1.20  0.00 
Open-Mindedness  4.38  0.77  17.67    53.41  33.33  12.05  0.40  0.80 
Self-Confidence  4.35  0.71  16.30     47.79  40.16  11.24  0.80  0.00 
Notes: Tabulated from Gallup’s Workplace Audit conducted February 2003.   
Scale: Response=5 is extremely important; Response=1 is not important at all. 
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TABLE 3.  SUMMARY OF ENVIRONMENTAL CHARACTERISTICS 
   
Characteristics  Mean  
     
ECONOMY-WIDE FACTORS   
Current economic condition    
      Excellent or good  0.23 
      Only fair or poor (base)  0.77 
Economic condition in a year   
      Get better  0.57 
      Stay the same or get worse (base)  0.43 
   
COMPANY CHARACTERISTICS   
Manufacturing  0.14 
Company size   
       Less than 500 employees  0.67 
       500 to less than 10,000 employees  0.21 
       10,000 employees or more (base)  0.13 
Hiring practice=1, if decision based on   
       structured interviews/tests  0.29 
Current financial condition    
      Excellent or good  0.73 
      Only fair or poor (base)  0.27 
Confident about company’s financial future   
      Strongly agree or agree   0.69 
      Neutral  0.19 
      Disagree or strongly disagree (base)  0.13 
   
WORK-PLACE CHARACTERISTICS   
Productivity=1, improved during past year  0.66 
Turn-over=1, increased during past year  0.22 
Gender mix   
      Co-workers mostly men  0.43 
      Co-workers mostly women  0.33 
      Co-workers half men, half women (base)  0.24 
Racial mix=1, co-workers mostly same race  0.68 
Note: Tabulated from Gallup’s Workplace Audit conducted February 2003.   
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TABLE 4. ORDERED PROBIT REGRESSION RESULTS  
  EDUCATIONAL  REFERENCES  WORK  WORK  TECHNICAL 
  BACKGROUND    RECORD  APPRAISALS  KNOWLEDGE 
CONSTANT  1.3091 
c/  2.6130 
a/  2.1960 
b/  3.1590 
a/  1.2755 
  (0.7645)  (0.7013)  (0.9525)  (0.8221)  (0.7911) 
ECONOMY-WIDE            
CURRENT 
CONDITION 
(Base: only fair; poor)  -0.2384  -0.2559  -0.4491 
b/  -0.4529 
b/  0.0156 
  (0.2119)  (0.1836)  (0.2065)  (0.2000)  (0.1993) 
FUTURE CONDITION 
(Base: stay same; get 
worse)  0.1825  -0.0970  0.2751  0.0497  -0.0716 
  (0.1684)  (0.1629)  (0.1734)  (0.1691)  (0.1651) 
CO. CHARAC.           
MANUFACTURING  -0.3407  -0.0947  0.0228  -0.4097 
c/  0.1051 
  (0.2390)  (0.2481)  (0.2584)  (0.2218)  (0.2273) 
COMPANY SIZE: 
LESS THAN 500  0.3083  0.0281  -0.1381  0.3673  0.3001 
  (0.2377)  (0.2553)  (0.2605)  (0.2784)  (0.2630) 
COMPANY SIZE: 
5OO TO LESS THAN 
10,000  0.4200  -0.2893  0.0325  0.1289  0.4276 
  (0.3063)  (0.2971)  (0.3021)  (0.3149)  (0.3103) 
HIRING PRACTICE  0.2304  0.2392  0.3210  -0.0988  -0.2019 
  (0.1852)  (0.1958)  (0.2011)  (0.1972)  (0.1955) 
CURRENT 
CONDITION  
(Base: only fair; poor)  -0.2598  -0.0882  -0.1392  0.0629  0.1267 
  (0.2266)  (0.2428)  (0.2617)  (0.2550)  (0.2308) 
FUTURE CONDITION 
(strongly agree; agree 
with statement of 
confidence in future)  0.7679 
a/  0.2469  0.7822 
b/  0.5706 
c/  0.4162 
  (0.2948)  (0.3119)  (0.3344)  (0.3382)  (0.3028) 
FUTURE CONDITION 
(neutral with statement 
of confidence in future)  0.7465 
a/  0.0632  0.5737 
c/  0.2044  0.5675 
c/ 
  (0.2878)  (0.3033)  (0.3086)  (0.3049)  (0.2993) 
WORK-PLACE 
CHAR.           
PRODUCTIVITY  0.0062  -0.1312  -0.0633  -0.1328  0.0141 
  (0.1633)  (0.1665)  (0.1691)  (0.1751)  (0.1685) 
TURN-OVER  0.3709 
b/  0.0803  -0.1645  0.2515  -0.0875 
  (0.1868)  (0.1942)  (0.1954)  (0.1953)  (0.2012) 
GENDER MIX; 
MOSTLY MEN  -0.2697  -0.2621  -0.0322  -0.3992  0.0019 
  (0.2012)  (0.2261)  (0.2282)  (0.2427)  (0.2053) 
GENDER MIX; 
MOSTLY WOMEN  -0.0487  0.1291  0.1330  0.0837  -0.0378 
  (0.2191)  (0.2314)  (0.2301)  (0.2592)  (0.2232) 
RACIAL MIX;  
MOSTLY SAME   0.2914  0.2231  0.2852  0.1443  -0.1127 
  (0.1800)  (0.1711)  (0.1923)  (0.1705)  (0.1785) 
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  EDUCATIONAL  REFERENCES  WORK  WORK  TECHNICAL 
  BACKGROUND    RECORD  APPRAISALS  KNOWLEDGE 
INDIVIDUAL CHAR.           
HIRING 
AUTHORITY: SOME  0.3607  0.1816  0.1431  -0.0498  0.5404 
b/ 
  (0.2256)  (0.2217)  (0.2294)  (0.2468)  (0.2358) 
HIRING 
AUTHORITY: GREAT 
DEAL  0.2269  0.3286  0.3564 
c/  0.2757  0.5146 
b/ 
  (0.2152)  (0.2204)  (0.2136)  (0.2301)  (0.2288) 
TENURE WITH 
COMPANY (LESS 
THAN 3 YEARS)  0.1827  0.3226  0.9893 
a/  0.4726  0.3814 
  (0.3002)  (0.2983)  (0.3491)  (0.3346)  (0.2958) 
TENURE WITH 
COMPANY (3 TO 
LESS THAN 15 
YEARS)  0.0931  0.2450  0.8045 
a/  0.3084  0.1564 
  (0.2350)  (0.2431)  (0.2427)  (0.2530)  (0.2155) 
TENURE AT 
POSITION (LESS 
THAN 3 YEARS)  -0.3088  -0.9568 
a/  -0.8180 
a/  -0.9560 
b/  -0.4591 
  (0.3351)  (0.3598)  (0.4085)  (0.4007)  (0.3550) 
TENURE AT 
POSITION (3 TO 
LESS THAN 15 
YEARS)  -0.4484  -0.5866 
b/  -0.4796  -0.6525 
b/  -0.2417 
  (0.2813)  (0.2833)  (0.3167)  (0.3251)  (0.2794) 
AGE  0.0063  -0.0025  0.0032  -0.0097  0.0056 
  (0.0082)  (0.0080)  (0.0087)  (0.0092)  (0.0082) 
MALE  -0.0177  0.0428  -0.1406  0.0577   0.1963 
  (0.1908)  (0.1636)  (0.1772)  (0.1881)  (0.1731) 
WHITE  -0.3672  -0.3577  -0.4115  -0.6209 
a/  -0.3099 
  (0.2400)  (0.2215)  (0.2545)  (0.2353)  (0.2739) 
EDUCATIONAL 
ATTAINMENT 
(Base: at lease college 
graduate)  -0.3107 
c/  0.1694  0.2648  0.3010 
c/  0.0460 
  (0.1659)  (0.1590)  (0.1796)  (0.1696)  (0.1702) 
           
           
Number of observations  249  249  249  249  249 
Log of likelihood 
function  -300.2784  -318.0305  -261.0108  -286.0053  -296.0829 
Restricted log 
likelihood  -326.7264  -336.1338  -285.0791  -316.0155  -310.5570 
Chi Square   52.8961 
a/  36.2065 
c/  48.1366 
a/  60.0204 
a/  28.9481 
Correct predictions  0.4137  0.3735  0.5100  0.4618  0.4739 
McFadden R
2  0.0809  0.0539  0.0844  0.0950  0.0466 
McKelvey-Zaviona R
2  0.2173  0.1524  0.2105  0.2490  0.1259 
Notes: The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
a/ Statistically significant at the 1% level; 
b/ Statistically 
significant at the 5% level; 
c/ Statistically significant at the 10% level.  
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TABLE 5. ORDERED PROBIT REGRESSION RESULTS  
  RESPONSIBILITY  PERSISTENCE  INITIATIVE  OPEN-  SELF- 
        MINDEDNESS  CONFIDENCE 
CONSTANT  4.0792 
a/  3.5711 
a/  2.6029 
b/  2.6331 
a/  4.2477 
a/ 
  (1.3380)  (0.9509)  (1.0493)  (0.8149)  (0.8861) 
ECONOMY-WIDE            
CURRENT 
CONDITION 
(Base: only fair; poor)  -0.2580  -0.4861 
b/  -0.1911  -0.3782 
c/  -0.1286 
  (0.2689)  (0.2300)  (0.2590)  (0.2137)  (0.2132) 
FUTURE CONDITION 
(Base: stay same; get 
worse)  0.0865  0.2110  0.4897 
b/  0.1218  0.0884 
  (0.2750)  (0.2054)  (0.2278)  (0.1764)  (0.1699) 
COMPANY CHAR.           
MANUFACTURING  -0.3683  -0.1017  -0.1546  -0.4563 
c/  -0.2359 
  (0.3146)  (0.2640)  (0.3315)  (0.2487)  (0.2279) 
COMPANY SIZE: 
LESS THAN 500  0.2477  0.2539  0.3342  0.1285  -0.0371 
   (0.3738)  (0.2831)  (0.3292)  (0.2772)  (0.2874) 
COMPANY SIZE: 500 
TO LESS THAN 
10,000  0.1050  0.1498  0.4708  -0.0554  0.0523 
  (0.4495)  (0.3265)  (0.3884)  (0.3154)  (0.3159) 
HIRING PRACTICE  -0.1143  -0.0946  -0.1913  -0.0387  -0.1684 
  (0.3053)  (0.2239)  (0.2498)  (0.2019)  (0.1984) 
CURRENT 
CONDITION 
(Base: only fair; poor)  -1.0389 
a/  -0.1384  -0.1157  -0.0376  -0.0903 
  (0.3618)  (0.2425)  (0.3142)  (0.2314)  (0.2383) 
FUTURE CONDITION 
(strongly agree; agree 
with statement of 
confidence in future)  1.4016 
a/  0.6202 
c/  0.6402 
c/  0.2905  0.3904 
  (0.4472)  (0.3204)  (0.3738)  (0.3082)  (0.3022) 
FUTURE CONDITION 
(neutral with statement 
of confidence in future)  0.5178  0.1092  0.3991  -0.0926  0.3484 
  (0.4418)  (0.3187)  (0.3626)  (0.2975)  (0.2907) 
WORK-PLACE 
CHAR.           
PRODUCTIVITY  0.1772  0.2138  0.2939  0.1673  -0.0059 
  (0.2495)  (0.2112)  (0.2424)  (0.1934)  (0.1837) 
TURN-OVER  -0.0978  0.0456  -0.0932  -0.0693  0.2442 
  (0.2874)  (0.2577)  (0.2855)  (0.2079)  (0.2064) 
GENDER MIX; 
MOSTLY MEN  -0.1826  -0.2245  -0.2358  -0.0510  -0.1541 
  (0.3031)  (0.2450)  (0.2664)  (0.2245)  (0.2284) 
GENDER MIX; 
MOSTLY WOMEN  0.6808 
c/  0.1973  0.1120  0.3354  -0.0601 
  (0.3742)  (0.2733)  (0.2819)  (0.2339)  (0.2563) 
RACIAL MIX; 
MOSTLY SAME   -0.0506  -0.1949  -0.3344  -0.2507  -0.2474 
  (0.2740)  (0.2101)  (0.2489)  (0.1980)  (0.1997) 
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  RESPONSIBILITY  PERSISTENCE  INITIATIVE  OPEN-  SELF- 
        MINDEDNESS  CONFIDENCE 
INDIVIDUAL CHAR.           
HIRING 
AUTHORITY: SOME  0.2498  -0.3254  0.2096  0.2959  -0.1929 
  (0.3478)  (0.2642)  (0.2857)  (0.2599)  (0.2336) 
HIRING 
AUTHORITY: GREAT 
DEAL  0.3750  -0.2708  0.2059  0.3961  0.0553 
  (0.3624)  (0.2690)  (0.2840)  (0.2471)  (0.2365) 
TENURE WITH 
COMPANY (LESS 
THAN 3 YEARS)  -0.4034  -0.2521  -0.1740  -0.2488  0.1683 
  (0.4276)  (0.3540)  (0.4127)  (0.3093)  (0.3213) 
TENURE WITH 
COMPANY (3 TO 
LESS THAN 15 
YEARS)  -0.5831 
b/  -0.2411  -0.1453  -0.2337  0.0141 
  (0.2936)  (0.2574)  (0.2937)  (0.2326)  (0.2444) 
TENURE AT 
POSITION (LESS 
THAN 3 YEARS)  -0.3066  -0.1538  0.1138  -0.2688  -0.7136 
b/ 
  (0.5310)  (0.4335)  (0.4389)  (0.3750)  (0.3559) 
TENURE AT 
POSITION (3 TO 
LESS THAN 15 
YEARS)  -0.1544  0.0294  0.3594  -0.2188  -0.4130 
  (0.4450)  (0.3493)  (0.3552)  (0.3286)  (0.3212) 
AGE  -0.0290 
c/  -0.0235 
b/  -0.0250 
b/  -0.0070  -0.0188 
b/ 
  (0.0153)  (0.0101)  (0.0123)  (0.0090)  (0.0092) 
MALE  -0.1912  -0.0824  -0.0633  0.0211  -0.1138 
  (0.3277)  (0.2142)  (0.2299)  (0.1801)  (0.2023) 
WHITE  0.1762  -0.0655  -0.1574  0.0064  -0.5174 
c/ 
  (0.3865)  (0.3096)  (0.3465)  (0.2735)  (0.2794) 
EDUCATIONAL 
ATTAINMENT 
(Base: at least college 
graduate)  0.3895  0.6062 
a/  0.4411 
b/  0.5480 
a/  0.5576 
a/ 
  (0.2851)  (0.1925)  (0.2178)  (0.1774)  (0.1696) 
           
           
Number of observations  249  249  249  249  249 
Log of likelihood 
function  -134.9032  -192.4668  -162.3076  -236.4748  -228.7658 
Restricted log 
likelihood  -161.5784  -214.9255  -183.6765  -253.2434  -249.9250 
Chi Square   53.3503 
a/  44.9173 
a/  42.7378 
b/  33.5371 
c/  42.3186 
b/ 
Correct predictions  0.7751  0.6064  0.7671  0.5542  0.5783 
McFadden R
2  0.1651  0.1045  0.1163  0.0662  0.0847 
McKelvey-Zaviona R
2  0.3369  0.2280  0.2424  0.1648  0.2105 
Notes: The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
a/ Statistically significant at the 1% level; 
b/ Statistically 
significant at the 5% level; 
c/ Statistically significant at the 10% level.   
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Table 6. MARGINAL EFFECTS FOR THE ORDERED PROBIT MODELS 
 
  R=0  R=1  R=2  R=3  R=4 
           
EDUC. BACKGROUND           
CO. FUTURE CONDITION 
(strongly agree; agree with 
statement of confidence in future)  -0.0492 
a/  -0.0607 
a/  -0.1890 
c/  0.1327  0.1662 
a/ 
CO. FUTURE CONDITION 
(neutral with statement of 
confidence in future)  -0.0221 
b/  -0.0372 
b/  -0.2106  0.0449  0.2249 
a/ 
WORKPLACE TURN-OVER  -0.0136 
b/  -0.0218 
b/  -0.1065  0.0402  0.1018 
a/ 
EDUC. ATTAINMENT (Base: at 
least college graduate)  0.0149 
a/  0.0216 
a/  0.0857  -0.0466 
a/  -0.0756 
c/ 
 
REFERENCES           
TENURE AT POSITION (LESS 
THAN 3 YEARS)  0.0617 
a/  0.0926 
a/  0.2106 
c/  -0.0941  -0.2708 
a/ 
TENURE AT POSITION (3 TO 
LESS THAN 15 YEARS)  0.0293 
a/  0.0517 
a/  0.1440  -0.0450  -0.1801 
a/ 
 
WORK RECORD           
ECONOMY CURRENT COND. 
(base: only fair; poor)  0.0027 
a/  0.0203 
a/  0.1027 
a/  0.0379  -0.1636 
a/ 
COMPANY FUTURE COND. 
(strongly agree; agree with 
statement of confidence in future)  -0.0057 
c/  -0.0385 
b/  -0.1779  -0.0562  0.2783 
a/ 
COMPANY FUTURE COND. 
(neutral with statement of 
confidence in future)  -0.0015  -0.0143 
c/  -0.1044  -0.1043 
b/  0.2245 
a/ 
HIRING AUTHORITY: GREAT 
DEAL  -0.0014  -0.0119 
  -0.0742  -0.0492  0.1367 
a/ 
TENURE WITH COMPANY 
(LESS THAN 3 YEARS)  -0.0027  -0.0242 
b/  -0.1700  -0.1817  0.3786 
a/ 
TENURE WITH COMPANY (3 
TO LESS THAN 15 YEARS)  -0.0035 
c/  -0.0281 
b/  -0.1635 
b/  -0.1082  0.3034 
a/ 
TENURE AT POSITION (LESS 
THAN 3 YEARS)  0.0052 
a/  0.0363 
a/  0.1799  0.0757  -0.2971 
a/ 
 
WORK APPRAISALS           
ECONOMY CURRENT COND. 
(base: only fair; poor)  0.0100 
a/  0.0328 
a/  0.1196  -0.0241  -0.1383 
a/ 
MANUFACTURING  0.0095 
a/  0.0307 
a/  0.1084  -0.0256  -0.1230 
b/  
COMPANY FUTURE COND. 
(strongly agree; agree with 
statement of confidence in future)  -0.0124 
b/  -0.0406 
b/  -0.1494  0.0265  0.1758 
a/ 
TENURE AT POSITION (LESS 
THAN 3 YEARS)  0.0228 
a/  0.0692 
a/  0.2399 
a/  -0.0400  -0.2919 
a/ 
TENURE AT POSITION (3 TO 
LESS THAN 15 YEARS)  0.0113 
a/  0.0399 
a/  0.1679 
a/  -0.0050  -0.2141 
a/ 
WHITE  0.0059 
a/  0.0258 
a/  0.1481 
b/   0.0475  -0.2273 
a/ 
EDUC. ATTAINMENT (Base: at 
least college graduate)  -0.0045  -0.0172 
c/  -0.0786  -0.0011  0.1014 
a/ 
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  R=0  R=1  R=2  R=3  R=4 
           
 
TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE           
COMPANY FUTURE COND. 
(neutral with statement of 
confidence in future)  -0.0122 
b/  -0.0254 
b/  -0.1208  -0.0533  0.2117 
a/ 
HIRING AUTHORITY: SOME  -0.0148 
b/  -0.0286 
b/  -0.1206  -0.0298  0.1938 
a/ 
HIRING AUTHORITY: GREAT 
DEAL  -0.0151 
b/  -0.0285 
b/  -0.1162  -0.0223  0.1821 
a/ 
Notes: The marginal effects for dummy variables are calculated as follows: Pr [R|x=1] - Pr [R|x=0]. The standard 
errors are available upon request. 
a/ Statistically significant at the 1% level; 
b/ Statistically significant at the 5% level; 
c/ Statistically significant at the 10% level.   
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Table 7. MARGINAL EFFECTS FOR THE ORDERED PROBIT MODELS 
           
           
  R=0  R=1  R=2  R=3  R=4 
           
RESPONSIBILITY           
COMPANY CURRENT 
CONDITION (Base: only fair; 
poor)  0.0011  0.0017  0.0183  0.1938 
c/  -0.2150 
a/ 
COMPANY FUTURE 
CONDITION (strongly agree; 
agree with statement of confidence 
in future)  -0.0085  -0.0101  -0.0706  -0.3413  0.4305 
a/ 
WORKPLACE GENDER MIX; 
MOSTLY WOMEN  -0.0008  -0.0014  -0.0143  -0.1429  0.1594 
c/ 
TENURE WITH COMPANY 
(LESS THAN 3 YEARS)  0.0009 
b/  0.0013  0.0127  0.0996  -0.1145 
b/ 
AGE  0.0000  0.0001  0.0007  0.0067  -0.0076 
b/ 
PERSISTENCE           
ECONOMY CURRENT 
CONDITIONS (Base: only fair; 
poor)  0.0064 
a/  0.0519 
a/  0.1287  -0.1869   
COMPANY FUTURE 
CONDITION (strongly agree; 
agree with statement of confidence 
in future)  -0.0081  -0.0651 
c/  -0.1630  0.2362   
AGE  0.0002 
b/  0.0020 
b/  0.0065  -0.0088   
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT 
(Base: at least college graduate)  -0.0050  -0.0495 
c/  -0.1643  0.2188   
INITIATIVE           
ECONOMY FUTURE 
CONDITIONS (Base: stay same; 
get worse)  -0.0072  -0.0242  -0.1269  0.1583   
COMPANY FUTURE 
CONDITION (strongly agree; 
agree with statement of confidence 
in future)  -0.0121  -0.0369  -0.1678  0.2167   
AGE  0.0003 
c/  0.0011 
b/  0.0065  -0.0080   
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT 
(Base: at least college graduate)  -0.0053  -0.0192  -0.1117  0.1363   
OPEN-MINDEDNESS           
ECONOMY CURRENT 
CONDITIONS (Base: only fair; 
poor)  0.0065 
a/  0.0029  0.0710 
a/  0.0696  -0.1500 
a/ 
MANUFACTURING  0.0092 
a/  0.0040  0.0905 
b/  0.0763  -0.1799 
a/ 
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT 
(Base: at least college graduate)  -0.0066  -0.0032  -0.0881  -0.1162 
b/  0.2140 
a/ 
SELF-CONFIDENCE           
TENURE AT POSITION (LESS 
THAN 3 YEARS)  0.0108 
a/  0.1241 
a/  0.1419  -0.2768   
AGE  0.0002 
b/  0.0030 
b/  0.0043  -0.0075   
WHITE  0.0037 
a/  0.0650 
a/  0.1335  -0.2022   
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT 
(Base: at least college graduate)  -0.0059  -0.0839 
b/  -0.1298  0.2196    
See notes in Table 6. 